The Return of the Hostages and the October Seven Crisis Policy

The Crises Following the October Seven

The October Seven created a series of deep crises, which exposed the weakness of the political, security, and social system in Israel.

• Severe Internal Crisis— The failure to return the hostages for many long months, and the deepening rift between the public and the state leadership.
• Economic Crisis— Entering enormous debts due to the cost of the war, extensive reserve mobilization, severe damage to businesses, and the uprooting of tens of thousands of citizens from their homes.
• Security Crisis— Loss of the sense of security among the inhabitants of the land, especially residents of the south and the north.
• International Crisis— The deterioration of Israel’s standing following the ground maneuver in Gaza, vis-à-vis regional states and countries that until now were central partners and supporters of Israel.
• Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza— The distress of Gaza’s civilians, which worsens as the war continues, increasing political and moral pressure on Israel.
• A Flammable Northern Arena— The danger of expansion of the campaign in the north, up to a comprehensive multi-front war.

The False Assumptions of the Israeli Government

• "Terror Can Be Defeated on the Battlefield"— Terror organizations such as Hamas, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah primarily feed on ideology and consciousness. Their goal is not only physical harm but creating a consciousness effect: fear, revenge, and ideological continuity. Therefore, war against them by force alone is like fighting a fungal body without understanding its nourishing substrate. The campaign is also ideological, social, and political. Physical resistance alone may perpetuate terror as a mode of action, strengthen the sense of resistance, and glorify the idea of jihad.
• "The IDF Is the Main Tool to Combat Terror"— Continuous use of the IDF to deal with terror weakens the army, wears it down, and forces it to operate under limited conditions that do not correspond to its central purpose. There is a need for a dedicated, small, intelligent, and flexible body to deal with asymmetric threats without exhausting the entire military system.
• "The Destruction of Hamas Is an Achievable Political Goal"— This perception ignores the fact that Hamas is not only a military organization but also an ideological, social, and governing movement. Harming only the current leadership may give rise to new movements born of revenge, destruction, and loss. Therefore, efforts must be made to delegitimize the current leadership, but care must be taken to avoid creating a vacuum that would lead to a more severe political and security spiral.
• "Military Victory Precedes the Return of the Hostages"— Preferring military victory over the return of the hostages is a continuous moral injustice. National security or the wounded honor of the army must not be restored at the expense of our brothers and sisters held captive.
• "Military Pressure Necessarily Leads to the Release of the Hostages"— In practice, the longer the time passes and the military pressure increases, the higher the prices demanded for their release. This perception contradicts fundamental principles in dealing with hostage situations and the moral obligation to return captives quickly.

Following the October Seven, Israel’s leadership tries to force reality by power and to create a new security reality immediately. But such a reality is not created by brute force alone. Precisely in light of the depth of the crisis, it must be understood that there is no quick solution to a multi-year conflict. The key is building proper strength, civil resilience, political responsibility, and long-term wisdom.

Conclusions- Victory of Reason

Reliance on force, power, and technology alone is an illusion. True victories must be achieved through wisdom, policy, moral responsibility, and building proper strength.

• The ground maneuver must be stopped, and diplomatic means should be pursued with Hamas as soon as possible, even at the cost of withdrawal and prisoner release, in order to return the hostages.
• Efforts must be made vigorously to prepare the IDF for a comprehensive war through deep change in organizational culture and broad reform of the security system.
• Civil infrastructures must be prepared for future conflicts in the north and south, and a trained, local, and effective emergency system must be built.
• A separate branch must be established to deal with asymmetric conflicts—a “small and smart army”—alongside decentralizing the large army into local territorial units.
• Advanced technological units must be maintained in a centralized structure under federal governance to ensure qualitative advantage, functional continuity, and overall national responsibility.
• Supporting governance systems must be regulated: local government, emergency systems, civilian home front, communities, infrastructures, and supply.
• It must be recognized that the Israeli reality has always been complex. Immediate solutions should not be sought for a conflict that has developed over many years. Leadership must speak truth to the public, prepare it for the long haul, and serve as a personal example in restoring security, responsibility, and citizens to their homes.